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VHERE THERE HAS BEEN A RECONVEYANCE.-Landau,

the alter ego of the plaintiff corporation, had conveyed real property
to his son without consideration for the purpose of concealing
the property from his creditors. Seventeen years later his son
conveyed the land to the defendant, Landau's son-in-law, who
simultaneously promised to convey it to the plaintiff. The defendant did reconvey but the plaintiff failed to record the deed
which was subsequently lost. The defendant has refused to execute
another deed. In the ensuing action brought to remove the cloud
on title, the Court of Appeals, in reversing the Appellate Division,
held that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief requested since the
doctrine of unclean hands is not applicable to a situation in which
the defendant-grantee has previously reconveyed the land. Seagirt
Realty Corp. v. Chazanof, 13 N.Y.2d 282, 196 N.E.2d 254, 246
N.Y.S.2d 613 (1963).
A conveyance which on its face is legally enforceable, but has
as its underlying objective the defrauding of the grantor's creditors,
has been deemed to be an illegal bargain.' The Anglo-American
concept that such an act is a fraudulent conveyance has as its
basis the Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances, enacted in 1571.2
The present New York statute,3 which is an exact replica of
the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,4 provides in part that
a "conveyance made . . . with actual intent . . . to hinder, delay,
or defraud . . . creditors, is fraudulent as to . . . creditors." -

A creditor can attack a fraudulent conveyance as being violative
of his rights, but as a matter of public policy the debtor-transferor
cannot. 6 In some situations where a fraudulent conveyance is
made, the agreement may provide for a reconveyance by the
grantee to the debtor-transferor. When this occurs and the grantee
refuses to reconvey, the courts deny relief to the debtor-transferor

on the ground that he has unclean hands,7 a defense predicated on
16A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1458 (1962); 1 MoORE, FRAUDULENT CON26 (1908).
1 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 11-13; 1 GLENN, FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES § 58 (rev. ed. 1940).
3 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 270-81. New York had a similar statute
against fraudulent conveyances as early as 1787. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1787,
ch. 44.
VEYANCFS
2 See

4 9B UNIFORM LAWS.

5 N.Y. DEBT. & CaRD. LAW § 276.
6 Hall v. Stryker, 27 N.Y. 596, 600

(1863); Weinhart v. Weinhart,
193 Misc. 424, 84 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1948), aff'd, 275 App. Div. 994, 90 N.Y.S.2d
918 (4th Dep't 1949); Davis v. Graves, 29 Barb. 480 (N.Y. 1859);
RESTATEMENT,. CONTRACTS §§ 598-601 (1932).
7 Pattison, v. Pattison, 301 N.Y. 65, 73-74, 92 N.E.2d 890, 895 (1950);
Pierce v. Pierce, 253 App. Div. 445, 447, 2 N.Y.S.2d 641, 642 (2d Dep't
1938), aff'd, 280 N.Y. 562, 20 N.E.2d 15 (1939); Moore v. Livingston, 14

How. Pr. 1 (N.Y. 1857).
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the wrongful conduct of the plaintiff." However, it has been
generally stated that in order for such a defense to be applicable
the wrongful act of a plaintiff must occur in the particular transaction which he is litigating.9 In other words, if a plaintiff can
prove his cause of action without relying on the illegal bargain,
he will prevail.
Where an agreement to reconvey is unenforceable because of
the grantor's unclean hands, the grantee nevertheless has a moral
obligation to perform his duty under the agreement.' 0 If, pursuant to this obligation, the grantee does reconvey, such act will
restore full legal title to the grantor."
In the present case the conveyances took the form of oral
trusts of real property, which are generally unenforceable in New
York because of the Statute of Frauds.' 2 However, where the
transferee, at the time of the conveyance, is in a confidential relationship with the transferor and the former promises to reconvey
but later refuses, the New York courts will impose a constructive
trust for the benefit of the grantor. 13 But where such a trust
is designed to defraud creditors the trust is invalid as to such
creditors 14 and the debtor-grantor, having acted wrongfully in
executing the trust, is prevented from enforcing it as beneficiary.','
Entirely different considerations are present where the original
transferee has reconveyed to the debtor-transferor and the latter
has lost the deed. In such a case, the court is confronted with
the problem of whether to help such plaintiff (debtor-transferor)
by clearing the cloud on his title, or to deny the plaintiff relief
because of unclean hands.' 6
Some jurisdictions uphold the
8 McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 669-70 (1899); McConnell v.
Commonwealth Pictures Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 465, 469, 166 N.E2d 494, 496, 199
N.Y.S.2d
483, 485 (1960).
9
E.g., Armstrong v. American Exch. Bank, 133 U.S. 433, 469 (1899);
Primeau v. Granfield, 193 Fed. 911, 916 (2d Cir. 1911).
10 McCann v. Commissioner, 87 F.2d 275, 276 (6th Cir. 1937); Davis
v. Graves, supra note 6, at 485; 6A CoaRiN, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 1462;
1 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 653.
"1 McCann v. Commissioner, 87 F.2d 275, 276 (6th Cir. 1937); Davis v.
Graves, supra note 6, at 484; Moore v. Livingston, supra note 7; Springfield
Homestead Ass'n v. Roll, 137 Ill. 205, 27 N.E. 184 (1891).
12 Pattison v. Pattison, supra note 7; RESTATEME
INNT (SECOND),
TRUSTS
§44 (1959); 1 Scorr, TRUSTS §§ 40, 44 (2d ed. 1956).
1l Ibid.
'4 Pattison v. Pattison, 301

N.Y. 65, 72, 92 N.E.2d 890, 895

(1950);

Foreman v. Foreman, 251 N.Y. 237, 167 N.E. 428 (1929); Sinclair v. Purdy,
235 N.Y. 245, 193 N.E. 255 (1923). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS
§ 44 (1959) ; 1 SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 12.
'5 Pattison v. Pattison, 301 N.Y. 65, 72-73, 92 N.E.2d 890, 894 (1950).
16 The usual situation occurs when the debtor changes the name of the
holder in the record in fraud of his creditors, but retains the deed. See
CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS

OF

EQUITY 20-22 (1950).
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defense and clear title for the defendant 17 rather than the plaintiff,
even though the defendant is in pari delicto. 18 Other jurisdictions
will aid neither the grantor nor the grantee. 19 When this occurs,
the land becomes completely inalienable, since the former has legal
and equitable title while the latter has record title. Finally, there
are still other jurisdictions which will permit the grantor in this
20
situation to prevail, since he holds both legal and equitable title.
The New York position in this area has not been clearly
defined. The case of Moore v. Livingston,21 decided in 1857,
appears to be the only case prior to the present one where this
precise issue was rais'ed. 22 In that case, the New York Supreme
Court stated that if the grantee-defendant had not reconveyed and
the plaintiff was seeking to enforce the grantee's promise to do
so, the plaintiff would be estopped because his original conveyance
was fraudulent. 23 However, since, in fact, there had been a
reconveyance, the plaintiff was the legal owner of the property
24
and was therefore entitled to have the deed restored to him.
In the principal case the property had also been reconveyed
to the plaintiff, giving him both legal and equitable title.25 Since
the transactions involved had been fully performed, the circumstances surrounding them were regarded by the Court as irrelevant.
The Court reiterated the principle of the Moore case and stated
that "a voluntary reconveyance to the fraudulent grantor, even
from the immediate fraudulent grantee, is effective as between
the parties and is entitled to the protection of the Courts in its
enjoyment." 26
Judge Burke, writing for the majority, observed that equity
is not an "avenger at large" and the defense of unclean hands
would not be applicable unless the plaintiff had "dealt unjustly in
the very transaction of which he complains." 27
The contention that moral considerations regarding the conduct
of the plaintiff should bar recovery was also rejected. In so
17

Basket v. Moss, 115 N.C. 448, 20 S.E. 733 (1894); 3
§941 (5th ed. 1941).

POMEROY,

EQUITY

183 PoMERoY, op. cit. supra note 17.

19 Italian-American Bank v. Lepore, 79 Colo. 466, 246 Pac. 792 (1926);
King v. Antrim Lumber Co., 70 Okla. 52, 172 Pac. 958 (1917).
Springfield
20 Carteledge v. McCoy, 98 Ga. 558, 25 S.E. 588 (1896);
Homestead Ass'n v. Roll, supra note 11; Ogasapian v. Danielson, 284 Mass.
27, 187 N.E. 107 (1933).
21 Supra note 7.
22 Seagirt Realty Corp. v. Chazanoff, 18 App. Div. 2d 1080, 1081, 239
N.Y.S.2d 411, 414 (2d Dep't 1963) (dissenting opinion).
23 Moore v. Livingston, supra note 7, at 11.
24 Ibid.
25 Seagirt Realty Corp. v. Chazanof, 13 N.Y.2d 282, 286, 196 N.E.2d
254, 256, 246 N.Y.S.2d 613, 615 (1963).
26 Id. at 286, 196 N.E.2d at 256, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 615-16.
27 Id. at 286-87, 196 N.E.2d at 256, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 616.
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holding, the Court referred to the opinion of Professor Chafee
that although the plaintiff had committed misdeeds in the past,
he is now the lawful owner of the property, and the records
should reflect that fact

28

The Court concluded that:

When equitable relief is sought, not to enforce an executory obligation
arising out of an illegal transaction, but to protect a status of legal
ownership, wrongs done by . . . [plaintiff] to creditors in respect of
the property at some time prior to the acquisition of the title now in
issue may not now be raised by this defendant to defeat otherwise available
29
relief.

The majority opinion is predicated on the fact that there
had been a reconveyance. Thus, the Court did not consider it
necessary to discuss whether the wrongful conduct of the plaintiff
in originally conveying to his son would affect the subsequent
transactions."
In contrast, the appellate division held that the
plaintiff had unclean hands and was precluded from enforcing
the trust despite the reconveyance. 3'
Although the appellate
division did not make an affirmative statement, their conclusion
would seem to imply that the defense of unclean hands was not
affected by the several conveyances. Judge Scileppi, in his dissent,
did consider the problem and concluded that the fraudulent design
of the plaintiff tainted the transaction which was the subject
32
of the present suit and therefore the defense was available.
However, Judge Scileppi did not distinguish between the defense
of unclean hands in an action to impose a constructive trust and
an action to remove a cloud on title, where the agreement has
already been executed.
In another dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Desmond also
treated the problem of several conveyances. He did so by means
33
of a comparison between the case of Flegenheiner v. Brogan
and the principal case. In Flegenheimer the plaintiff's intestate
transferred the stock of a brewery to a "dummy" because the
federal and state liquor authorities would not issue him a permit.
The "dummy" thereupon conveyed to the defendant. The plain28 CHAFFE, op. cit. supra note 16, at
29 Seagirt Realty Corp. v. Chazanof,

21-22.

13 N.Y2d 282, 287, 196 N.E.2d 254,
256,30246 N.Y.S.2d 613, 615 (1963).
1d. at 286, 196 N.E.2d at 256, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 615. If there had
not been a reconveyance the result would have probably been different even

though there were several transactions. This is so because the court would
look into the motives and the circumstances surrounding the conveyance

to the
defendant Ibid.
3

1Seagirt Realty Corp. v. Chazanof, 18 App. Div. 2d 1080, 239 N.Y.S.2d
411 32(2d Dep't 1963).

Seagirt Realty Corp. v. Chazanof, 13 N.Y.2d 282, 290, 196 N.E.2d
254, 258, 246 N.Y.S.2d 613, 619 (1963).
33284 N.Y. 268, 30 N.E.2d 591 (1940).
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tiff contended that the defendant knew of the relationship between
her intestate and the "dummy." The Court of Appeals found
that the "action is one brought by an alleged secret owner to
vindicate his assertion of beneficial title to property which he
had parted with in order to perpetrate a fraud upon the statute
34
which regulates and controls traffic in alcoholic beverages."
Based on this finding the court held that the plaintiff could
not maintain the action because the "transactions were so far
against the common good." 35
Although, there were several transactions in the Flegenheimer
case, it is distinguishable on its facts from the principal case.
Furthermore, it does conform to the general rule that the
illegality which gives rise to the defense of unclean hands must
occur in the transaction being litigated. 30 In Flegenheimer, the
defendant was in possession and, as a result, the plaintiff had
to show title in her intestate in order to prevail. To do so it
was necessary for the plaintiff to rely upon the illegal transaction
between her intestate and the "dummy."
In the principal case
the plaintiff did not have to rely on his fraudulent conveyance
since he was merely seeking to clear title to land which he legally
owned.
The defense of unclean hands is definitely not intended to
protect an equally culpable defendant.3 7 The defense has as its
justification the protection of the public from dishonest transactions. 38 Therefore, an issue is raised as to whether a plaintiff
who has acted wrongfully should prevail because: (1) he is
suing to clear a cloud on title instead of suing for specific performance or, (2) that there have been several conveyances and
to establish his cause of action he need not show the wrong
he has committed. To permit a wrongdoer to prevail under such
circumstances tends to frustrate the purpose underlying the defense
of unclean hands.3 9 However, prominent authors have questioned
whether the defense should be applicable in any situation. For
example, Professor Wigmore has stated that the "whole notion is
radically wrong in principle and produces extreme injustice." 40
Id. at 272, 30 N.E.2d at 592.
Id. at 273, 30 N.E.2d at 593.
36Armstrong v. American Exch. Bank, 133 U.S. 433, 469 (1889);
Primeau v. Granfield, 193 Fed. 911, 916 (2d Cir. 1911).
37 McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 669 (1899); Stone v. Freeman,
298 N.Y. 268, 271, 82 N.E.2d 571, 572 (1948). See 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 1630 (rev. ed. 1930).
38,McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 669-70 (1899); Primeau v.
Granfield, 193 Fed. 911, 913 (2d Cir. 1911). See 5 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra
note 37, at § 1628.
39 McConnell v. Commonwealth Pictures Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 465, 166 N.E.2d
494, 199 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1960).
40 WIGMORE, A S,-inary of Quasi-Contracts,25 AM. L. Rav. 695, 712 n.k
(1891). See generally Wantulok v. Wantulok, 67 Wyo. 45, 223 P.2d 1030
34
35
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The grounds for this criterion are that it is unjust for one guilty
party, the plaintiff, to suffer while the defendant who is in part
delicto is rewarded; and that the penalty of not being able to
maintain the action is utterly disproportionate to the offense.
Although Professor Wigmore's statement may appear correct
it must be remembered that the public must also be protected.
The question to be answered, in these cases, is whether the court
is going to avail itself of every opportunity to discourage fraudulent
conveyances. If the answer is in the affirmative the plaintiff
should not prevail, regardless of the nature or form of the action. 41
The courts should not allow a wrongdoing plaintiff to prevail
merely because his pleadings follow a seemingly correct analytical
approach. Although the defense of unclean hands does have
its pitfalls, its application will notify debtors that a court will not
sanction the circumvention of the fraudulent conveyance laws.
By limiting the applicability of this defense the Court is not
promoting justice but sanctioning its circumvention. It is endorsing
a method by which a debtor can invoke
the judicial machinery to
42
evade his obligation to his creditor.

x
PROCEDURE- SERVICE OF PROCESS - DESIGNATION OF AGENT
IN CONTRACT HELD NOT VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS DESPITE
Plaintiff, a Delaware corporation doing business in New York, entered into a
leasing contract with defendants, Michigan farmers. The contract
was signed in Michigan and mailed to New York by defendants.
A contract clause appointed a New York resident, the wife of
one of the officers of the plaintiff corporation, as defendants' agent
for service of process. There was no contractual provision for
ABSENCE OF PROVISION FOR ACTUAL NOTICE. -

(1950) ; CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 16, at 21; WADE, Restitution of Benefits
Acquired Through Illegal Transactions, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 261, 301-05
(1947).
41 See REsTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §§ 46, 140 (1937).

42 Predicated on the holding of the principal case, a debtor could fraudulently convey his property and have the court aid him in his act. That is,
a debtor could change the name of the owner of the property on the record,
while retaining the deed. After an accord with his creditor he would
institute an action to clear cloud on title. The debtor might also convey
to a third party. The third party would then record the deed and simultaneously reconvey to the debtor. The debtor would then hold the deed
without recording until he reaches an accord with his creditors.

